Abstract. In one proposed use of digital watermarks, the owner of a document D sells slightly di erent documents, D 1 ; D 2 ; : : : to each buyer; if a buyer posts his/her document D i to the web, the owner can identify the source of the leak. More general attacks are however possible in which k buyers create some composite document D ; the goal of the owner is to identify at least one of the conspirators. We show, for a reasonable model of digital watermarks, fundamental limits on their e cacy against collusive attacks. In particular, if the e ective document length is n, then at most O( p n= ln n) adversaries can defeat any watermarking scheme. Our attack is, in the theoretical model, oblivious to the watermarking scheme being used; in practice, it uses very little information about the watermarking scheme. Thus, using a proprietary system seems to give only a very weak defense.
Introduction

The General Problem
The very properties that have made digital media so attractive present di cult, not clearly surmountable, security problems. The ability to cheaply copy and transmit perfect copies of text, audio, and video opens up new avenues both for electronic commerce and for electronic piracy. The advent of ubiquitous high speed networks and network caching algorithms further ampli es this problem. Anyone will have the capability to cheaply distribute any movie, song, book, or picture (which we will generically call a document) in their possession to anyone else on the planet. The challenge is to maintain intellectual property in this environment.
There are a number of approaches to this problem; we concentrate on methods related to digital watermarking, also known as digital ngerprinting. In one general approach, the media to be distributed is altered so that it contains a hidden \do not copy" signal (the \watermark"). Most or all of the hardware for viewing, copying, or transmitting the media look for this signal and prevent illicit use. Two major problems with this approach are preventing the construction of illicit hardware that ignores the safeguards and preventing the erasure of the hidden signal. The latter problem is aggravated by the fact that one has to e ectively distribute oracles (e.g., copying machines) that give feedback as to whether the signal can still be detected.
We know of no such watermarking scheme that has survived a serious attack. Indeed, with one commercially distributed scheme for watermarking images, the mark was so delicate that owners would accidentally destroy it themselves (such as by resizing the image prior to selling it).
A less ambitious use of watermarking is to identify pirates after the fact. That is, nothing prevents a pirate from anonymously posting ones intellectual property to the web, but one should be able to identify who did so. The general approach is to, given a document D, perturb it in an unobtrusive manner to generate documents D Innumerable schemes have been proposed for both uses; we refer to 3] for a discussion of many of these schemes.
Modeling Collusion Attacks
Of course, a pirate may not be so cooperative as to simply post its document unchanged. It may attempt to alter it or, perhaps in concert with others, combine several documents to produce a document that cannot be linked with any of the \original" marked documents.
The rst theoretical modeling and treatment of collusion of attacks was given by Boneh We now specify our requirements for Mark, Detect, and Attack. First, we consider the delity of the marked documents and the attacked documents. We require that d(D i ; D) =2, where d denotes the Euclidean metric. We require a successful attack to achieve d(D ; D) 0 =2; the closer 0 is to , the better the attack. Intuitively, =2 indicates the degree to which the watermarking algorithm is willing to distort D, and 0 =2 indicates the amount of distortion past which the document is no longer worth stealing or protecting.
(We use =2 instead of to simplify the analysis. By the triangle inequality, our condition enforces that d(D i ; D j ) ; this turns out to be the more natural condition to consider.)
Next, we consider the e cacy of the detection algorithm. Detect succeeds if it returns an i 2 fi 1 ; : : : ; i t g. Detect can fail in two ways: (i) The owner can fail to identify any of the pirates by returning ; (a false negative), or (ii) the owner can falsely conclude that an innocent person is a pirate (a false positive). A false negative is unfortunate; a false positive is catastrophic. If one fails to catch a pirate 90% of the time, the 10% may deter some (but not all), but if one misidenti es an innocent person 1% of the time one may not be able to ever credibly accuse anyone of piracy.
Our Result
We show a generic attack procedure Attack that defeats all watermarking schemes for the above model. It is oblivious to the Mark and Detect schemes. It has the following properties:
1. The attack uses t = p n= ln n documents, where is a parameter (the larger the parameter, the more e ective the attack), and controls the delity of the attack (we ignore integer rounding issues). 3. Suppose Detect succeeds with probability above, say 2= p ln n, then it must incur a false positive probability of (n c ), for some c, where c depends on . More general tradeo s are implied by our analysis.
Related Work
Boneh and Shaw introduced the rst formal model of collusion resistance. They consider a more abstract model in which one may insert a sequence of marks into a document; each mark has a value associated with it (most usually boolean) .
They assume that if for all the documents available to the attacker, the i-th mark has the same value, then the attacker cannot remove this mark. If, however, two of the documents disagree on the value of the i-th mark, the attacker can change its value as it sees t. In this model, they show upper and lower bounds for the collusion resistance as a function of the number of marks. Further improvements and additions to their basic scheme appear in 9, 10, 8] .
It is impossible to directly compare this model and its models with that of Cox et. al. The model of 3] gives a more low-level model for watermarking. One pleasing aspect of our result is that it essentially matches to within a constant factor some lower bounds on collusion resistance proven by 5]. For the case where m = n O(1) , they show that one can achieve collusion resistance of ( p n= ln n), given a very specialized assumption about the distribution of D (or given a very restricted class of attacks). Our bounds show that this is essentially the best one can hope for, regardless of the assumptions one makes about the distribution of the documents. In contrast, there is a substantial gap in the upper and lower bounds known for the Boneh-Shaw model.
Along a similar vein, Chor, Fiat, and Naor 2] introduce traitor tracing schemes. In their scenario, a large amount of data is broadcast, or made publicly available (say by DVD disks) in encrypted form; keys allowing the data to be decrypted are individually sold. Subsequent work in this area includes 6, 7]; a further twist on key protection is given in 4]. In one respect, these models have a similar avor to the scenario we consider, in that one wishes to identify those who publish or resell their keys. This work, however, is intended for the regime where the plaintext is so large that it is hard to (re)broadcast it. Watermarking hopes to protect much smaller data (hundreds of kilobytes).
Road Map
In Section 2 we describe our attack. In Section 3 we analyze its e cacy. In Section 4 we present conclusions and open problems.
The Attack
Our attack is parameterized by a collusion parameter t and a noise parameter . We will analyze the case where t = ( = ) p n= ln n, is some (typically constant) parameter, and = =(2 p n), where n is the length of the attacked document; i.e., the dimension of D, and is a (typically small constant) parameter. Let N( ; 2 ) be the Gaussian (normal) distribution with mean and standard deviation .
Described in words, the colluding attack is to average the t vectors and perturb with a random Gaussian noise at each component. is to be determined later. Observe that in the abstract model, Attack uses no information about Mark, except for . We discuss more practical issues in Section 4.
There is a tension in our choice of t and . As we will see, the larger the values of t and , the more e ective the attack. However, we would like to minimize the number t of adversaries (document copies) needed, and increasing weakens the delity of the attacked copy.
Analysis
We analyze the e cacy of Attack as a function of the parameters t and . First we analyze the delity of the attack, and then we show, for any choice of Detect, a tradeo between the probability that it generates a false positive and the probability that it generates a false negative.
The Fidelity of the Attack
For the rest of our discussion, high probability mean with probability 1 o(1) as n grows large. . It remains to bound the magnitude of cos . By the spherical symmetry of the distribution on R, has the same distribution as the angle between two random unit rays from the origin. For this case, it is well known that j cos j is O(ln n= p n) with high probability. Hence, with high probability, The lemma follows.
A Tradeo between Errors
Attack ignores the values of i 1 ; : : : ; i t . To simplify our notation,we assume without loss of generality that the attacking coalition is 1; : : : ; t.
Suppose on D Detect outputs a valid value of i 2 f1; : : : ; tg with probability at least , where the probability is taken over the randomness used by Attack and any randomness used by Detect. Assume without loss of generality that Player 1 is the player most often detected. We now proceed to show that there is a tradeo between the false positive and false negative probabilities. First we de ne a parameterized set of problematic documents for which the false positive probability is low.
De nition 1. Given probability measure D 0 and D , and a parameter , we de ne the bad set B by B = fx j Pr
This set is bad for the attacker, because Detect can safely output 1 without incurring too large a probability of producing a false positive. Lemma 2 bounds the probability that Detect makes a false positive as a function of . We now obtain, for some reasonable setting of parameters, a lower bound on the false positive probability. Proof. For the proof, we set some of the parameters in the expression given in Lemma 2 and use the lemma to lower bound the probability of a false positive.
The value of > 0 must be chosen to balance between two competing considerations imposed by the term and the =t Pr x D x 2 B ] term. Intuitively, when is close to 1, then x is often in B , but this is not so advantageous for the Detect; when is small, it is indeed good for Detect to have x 2 B , but this hardly ever happens.
We will choose such that Pr D B ] =(2t); will be n for some constant . Since Pr x D Detect(x) = 1] =t, Pr x D Detect(x) = 1^x 6 2 B ] =(2t). Then the probability of a false positive for document instances from D 0 , will be at least =(2t).
Although each point x we consider is an n-dimensional quantity, we can exploit the spherical symmetry of n-dimensional Gaussian distributions as follows. 
